For centuries foreigners have, if not somewhat tragically, played a central role on the African continent. In light of a “new scramble for Africa” this trend looks set to continue. Importantly, this has profound implications for the measurement and understanding of political risk on the continent. The geopolitics of Africa cannot be understood without examining the influence and interests of foreigners. In this regard it is vital that analysts fully appreciate the role that traditional powers such as the United States, Great Britain and France and emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil have and are playing.

Pasco Risk Management is fully cognizant of this fact. Our analysis of African political risk is grounded in a thorough understanding of domestic politics on one level and a deep insight into regional and international relations on another. Our advisory board includes esteemed diplomats and business executives while our analysts have vast experience of the African continent and draw on high level in-country sources. This feature, the first in a series of such articles both, describes and explains US Africa policy under George W Bush and its evolution, under Barack Obama and considers the relationship between the US and South Africa since Obama was elected.

For many, the election of Barack Obama as the president of the United States in early 2009 heralded a new dawn for relations between Africa and the US. With both African and American ancestry, Obama's stunning victory was greeted by Africans from Cape Town to Cairo, who celebrated his election by dancing in the streets. His promise of change enthralled ordinary Africans who had grown disillusioned with the largely dysfunctional relationship which the continent enjoyed with the US. Under George W Bush, the US was strongly criticized for its instrumentalist view of Africa. Obama offered a fresh start in which Africans would be treated as equals.

As US president, Obama made his first visit to sub-Saharan Africa in July 2009. Rather than visiting Kenya as some expected he would, Obama chose Ghana, a stable and economically prosperous democracy in an otherwise volatile neighbourhood. Predictably, his keynote address focused on issues  relating to governance, institution building and corruption. Obama's speech was, on the whole, well received even if it did not reveal a great deal about US foreign policy towards Africa. Beyond Obama's rhetoric of engagement, partnership and consensus, a clear picture of US Africa policy is yet to emerge. In this regard, rather than articulating a clear vision for Africa, the White House has tackled crises on the continent as they have emerged. Nevertheless, while approaches differ, increasingly the Obama administration's Africa policy mirrors that of the Bush administration, which has led some analysts to conclude that “the more things change, the more they stay the same.”

US Africa policy under George W Bush was nothing short of controversial, at least that is, on the continent and in much of the developing world. In the months preceding his election, Bush, somewhat cynically, stated that Africa would not be a priority for his administration: a parochial Bush made it very clear that he would be an American president for the American people. All this changed on 11 September 2001. Almost overnight the failed state, of which there are a number in Africa, was securitized. Those African states considered weak or failed and with significant Islamic populations, were prioritized. Albeit far less important than Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider Middle East, countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Kenya were the focus of increased concern and engagement by the post-9/11 Bush administration. While 9/11 spurred renewed US interest in Africa, this interest was sustained by the expansion on the continent of emerging powers, China and India. Their increasing political and economic influence on the continent as well as the insatiable hunger of these two Asian giants for natural resources coincided with America's growing reliance on African oil after a move by the country to lessen its dependence on the volatile Middle East.

The neo-realist hawks who dominated the Bush administration and US foreign policy approached Africa as a zero sum game in which the supply of vital energy reserves had to be secured and the expanding influence of China and India countenanced. Predictably this resulted in the militarization of US foreign policy, including US/Africa relations. At the risk of appearing overly simplistic, the launch of AFRICOM, an independent military command structure for Africa, was arguably the most important development during the tenure of George W Bush, dwarfing even much vaunted trade and development initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

AFRICOM has proved nothing short of controversial and critics have attacked its “neo-colonial and imperialist” motives and underpinnings. Especially controversial were initial plans to build a permanent base to house AFRICOM in a friendly, strategically important African country. However in the face of strong opposition and following a strategic review by the US military, plans to build the base were shelved. US officials have defended AFRICOM by arguing that it is first and foremost an internal reorganization of the US military with few implications, and no negative implications, for Africa. However such suggestions have failed to obscure the increasingly expansive role that the US military, and US private military contractors, have and are playing on the continent. This role includes the training and material support of friendly African militaries as well as the conduct of covert operations from strategically located satellite bases in Kenya and Djibouti.

For Africans, Obama's election signaled a new beginning for relations between Africa and the United States. By the end of the charismatic campaign upon which he swept into power, Obama was seen as not only a president for the American people, but a president for Africans and the World. The reality however is that Obama was elected by the US populace and not the marginalized and downtrodden Africans that he so inspired. As the glow of his ascent to high office has waned and in the face of some of the greatest military, political, economic and social challenges that the US has faced, Obama has become not only increasingly inward-looking but also growingly realist in his political calculations. As a result, and as this impacts on US/Africa relations, the drivers of the Obama administration's Africa policy remain primarily the expansion of China and India, energy security and the War on Terror.

With the same underlying drivers, while the approach and rhetoric differs, US Africa policy under Obama is increasingly similar to, or rather a continuation of, the Africa policy of the Bush administration. In fact, some have argued that, under Obama, there has been a broadening and deepening of the militarization of the relationship between Africa and the US. While largely unpopular, such a view is gaining traction amongst analysts who have highlighted the expanding US supply and support of the Angolan, Nigerian, Rwandan and Ugandan militaries; and US covert operations in Somalia and Sudan. US officials have defended the perpetuation of controversial Republican policies, arguing that AFRICOM is playing a vital role in creating viable and sustainable African states. Nevertheless it is hard to see how the military support for some regimes, with at best, questionable democratic and human rights records, does not contradict Obama's mantra of good governance.

Looking ahead, the US is likely to remain closely engaged in countries which are either unstable and have a significant Islamic population or which have large oil and other energy reserves. It is no coincidence that there are plans underfoot to construct one of largest US embassies anywhere, in Ghana, where massive oil reserves have recently been discovered. Nigeria and Angola are both likely to remain a priority as are Uganda and Rwanda. In the case of Angola, it is a key oil producer while Nigeria, also a vitally important oil producer, is a potentially unstable hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism. Both Uganda and Rwanda are darlings of the West and particularly the US. They are held up as shining examples of African democracies with robust, open economies; even if this ignores the increasingly dictatorial tendencies of their Presidents Museveni and Kagame. On Africa's east coast Kenya, Sudan and Somalia will continue to be important in the War on Terror. Kenya is a concern, not least because it could re-descend into the chaos which followed the disputed 2007/2008 elections, while Sudan, with vast oil reserves and currently holding its own elections, has proved rabidly anti-American in the past. The dangerous wasteland that is Somalia remains a safe haven for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

So where does this leave South Africa? Unlike many other African countries, there has not been an overwhelming militarization of the relationship between the US and South Africa. Admittedly, while the two countries enjoy historically close military ties, the relationship is first and foremost diplomatic and economic. South Africa is an important voice and vote on the international stage, especially in the context of relations between the US and emerging powers China, India and Brazil. Furthermore, on account of its military and economic strength, the country is a key member of the African Union and the Southern African Development Community. As a result, the US sees South Africa as a country through which it can wield influence in both Africa and the developing world.

South Africa is Africa's economic power house. It is the US's largest trade partner outside of Africa's oil producing states. For many American companies, South Africa is the gateway to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa while South African companies are important partners for US firms doing business on the continent. While it pales in significance with Asia, South Africa is nevertheless important, if not only because of the economic expansion in sub-Saharan Africa of rising powers such as China, India and Brazil.

While the United States and South Africa recently signed a memorandum of understanding to enter into a “strategic dialogue”, a number of analysts are of the opinion that South Africa nevertheless lies far down both Obama and Hillary Clinton's list of priorities. Certainly the country's influence and importance in the eyes of Americans appears to have waned. South Africa's inability or refusal to “boss” the African continent seems to have left many US officials disillusioned, while perhaps the Obama administration has a greater appreciation of the limits of South African power than past US administrations. Notwithstanding the impact of the global financial crisis and economic problems in the US, falling levels of trade between South Africa and the US as well as declining foreign direct investment by US companies in South Africa appears to indicate that South Africa's importance from a US perspective may indeed be waning.

Pasco believes that while the Obama administration is preoccupied with a range of more serious foreign policy issues, the reversing economic relationship between the US and South Africa needs to be understood in terms of political risk in South Africa and not a lack of US diplomatic engagement. Simply put, economic relations between the US and South Africa are constrained not by the US's diplomatic relegation of South Africa, but rather by a deterioration of the political risk profile of the southern African country.

In this regard an unstable electricity supply, calls by some ANC leaders to nationalize the country's mines, and a power struggle within the upper echelons of the ANC have undoubtedly spooked many US investors. The recent murder of AWB leader Eugene Terreblanche, together with ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema's consistently militant and inflammatory rhetoric have served only to heighten American fears. The increase in South African political risk was emphasized at a recent meeting of US businesspeople in Johannesburg, which could be best described as gloomy. While the 2010 FIFA World Cup and Barack Obama's planned visit to South Africa during the tournament is likely to lighten the mood, the risk outlook remains bleak. Certainly in the months following the World Cup, President Zuma, who looks increasingly vulnerable, and his government, which at the moment is at odds with one another, will need to answer some tough questions. For political risk analysts however, the most important question at this stage is, “will the ANC's political centre hold?”