As stated in a previous article on this site (Is South Africa a 2010 SWC Terror Risk?) the dramatic attack against the Togo national football team in the Angolan exclave of Cabinda has had an impact far beyond Angola and the African Nations Cup. In the immediate aftermath of the incident there was heated debate and sharply divided opinions as to the potential security risks for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, especially so far as terrorism is concerned. On one hand, various sectors – particularly the international media – have continued to suggest that the terror risk associated with the 2010 SWC is unacceptably high; on the other hand, South African authorities have steadfastly insisted that all necessary security arrangements are in place. Over the past week, the focus of concern in the media has been whether South Africa's border controls are adequate to prevent the infiltration of terrorists intent on using violence to disrupt the event. Perhaps the strongest statement on the matter came from the South African Institute of Race Relations, which expressed concern about the possibility of a “massive strike” against Western interests in South Africa during or leading up to SWC 2010, arguing that a number of pre-conditions – including lax border controls – exist to encourage such a strike.

In view of the level of interest and concern in this topic, Pasco Chief Executive Officer George Nicholls briefly considers and comments on some of the key issues around the threat of terrorism to the 2010 SWC.

Nicholls confirms the perceptions that the Cabinda incident has raised levels of anxiety about security for SWC 2010. Citing client-confidential dealings and reports, he notes however that for the most part teams, organisers and global companies have been aware of security risks for some time and that Cabinda has merely raised awareness of these risks. “Although some sections of the media have unfortunately adopted an alarmist approach”, Nicholls states, “for the most part our experience is that on the part of teams and corporate clients the approach to managing security and other risks is based on a rational, reasoned appraisal of key risk indicators”. In this approach, Nicholls explains, “the spectre of a brutal and bloody attack is one scenario that has to be carefully considered and evaluated, but there are a range of less dramatic scenarios that should be entertained and planned for”. Examples of these scenarios include political kidnappings, hostage taking, common crime, outages, communicable disease and natural disasters. In addition, Nicholls believes that on the whole there is a recognition that in today's global security environment there is an element of risk to any large event in any location.  As a result, he predicts that once the 2010 SWC is completed concerns about terrorism will inevitably shift towards the 2010 New Delhi Commonwealth Games, 2012 London Olympics and other major international sporting events.

Turning to the question of whether South Africa's border controls might actively encourage a terrorist attack against 2010 SWC, Nicholls is quick to suggest that this argument is somewhat oversimplified and fails to account for the sophisticated methods used by international terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda. “Yes, South Africa has long borders that are difficult to monitor and secure”, Nicholls acknowledges, “but firstly there is no country in the world that has completely impregnable borders and secondly skilled terrorists (and other criminals) are adept at circumventing even the tightest border controls. As it simply isn't possible for any authorities to patrol and secure all points of access by land, sea and air on a 24/7 basis there will always be opportunities to infiltrate a target country if the willingness is there”. Nicholls, who has advised a number of government and corporate clients on counter-terrorism measures over the past two decades, also points out that a sophisticated terrorist attack requires more than simply infiltrating across a border. “It is one thing getting into a country to stage an attack, as the 2008 Mumbai terror attack vividly demonstrates. But terrorists also require advance reconnaissance and a support infrastructure within the target country to prepare for and launch an assault”. These requirements, Nicholls comments, translate into in-country actions that can alert vigilant authorities to an emerging threat. In the case of the 2010 SWC, it must be anticipated that the South African authorities have been working intensely and in close collaboration with international law enforcement agencies to identify, monitor and respond to potential threats of this nature. This includes ensuring tighter controls at airports and other border posts, together with a range of other counter-terrorism actions.

Given the current global environment, it is unlikely that the final word has been heard on the threat of terrorism to the 2010 SWC. Nicholls believes that while it would be short-sighted to ignore the risks, it is equally important to not overplay them. “It could be argued that if matches are played in empty venues or in a militarised atmosphere then the militant elements that may wish to disrupt the event have met their objective. On the other hand, it would be foolish to act as if there is no risk at all”, he comments.

So where is the middle ground in this? For Nicholls it comes down to optimal awareness and preparation for SWC 2010 an approach to ensure that security requirements are guided by continual assessment of accurate and up-to-date information according to a range of pre-designated threat indicators, rather than soley upon theoretical scenarios which could be obsolete by the time that 2010 SWC kicks off.